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I CAN STILL HEAR YOU SAYING YOU WOULD NEVER
BREAK THE CHAIN: HOW HIGHER EDUCATION
ADMISSIONS POLICIES PUT LAW FIRMS AT RISK OF
LOSING CORPORATE CLIENTS
Jolie Abrams *
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—The rich diversity at higher education
institutions and the benefits that flow from that diversity will foster the
tolerance, acceptance, and understanding that will ultimately make
race-conscious admissions obsolete.
—Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President
& Fellows of Harvard Coll.
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IF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS ABANDON AFFIRMATIVE-ACTIONBASED POLICIES IN THEIR ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS IN FAVOR OF RACENEUTRAL POLICIES, THEY RISK CREATING A PIPELINE THAT DIRECTLY
CONFLICTS WITH CORPORATIONS’ DIVERSITY REQUIREMENTS FOR HIRING
LAW FIRMS

While law firms attempt to increase their diversity numbers, they still fall
short when it comes to achieving their desired level. 1 Often, they have trouble
making “meaningful changes” to improve their equity and inclusion. 2 Moreover,
this push to diversify intensifies “tokenism,” which, unfortunately, alienates
1
Patrick Smith, Rushing to Meet Client Demands, Law Firms Risk Alienating Diverse Lawyers, The
American Lawyer (Dec. 15, 2021, at 05:00 AM) (https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2021/12/15/rushing-tomeet-client-demands-law-firms-risk-alienating-diverse-lawyers/?slreturn=20220027140858).
2
Id.
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minority groups. 3 One obvious reason that law firms rush their diversification is
that corporations who seek to retain them demand diverse lawyers handling their
accounts. This forces law firms to demonstrably prioritize diversity on paper
over meaningful inclusion, which turns diversity into a meaningless quota.
What corporations fail to realize is that diversity does not start in the law
firm. In fact, it does not even start in law schools. Diversity begins with higher
education admissions processes. If the population of college graduates is not
diverse, then the group of students who are eligible to apply to law school has
an even smaller chance of achieving the desired diversity. From there, the group
of students who graduate from law school graduate chooses to become
practicing lawyers in a private practice law firm are similarly even less diverse.
Law firms already have a small pool of applicants from whom they can hire, and
the population gets less and less diverse at each fork in the proverbial path to
these jobs. Thus, the diversity pipeline’s implementation must start with the
higher education institutions’ admissions. Affirmative action is a component of
these higher institutions’ admissions policy to enable them to fairly assess
prospective students.
There is a long history of juxtaposition between discrimination against
minority groups—groups that, historically, would not have access to the
opportunity at hand—and unfair advantages for white men. 4 Therefore,
unsurprisingly, affirmative action sits at the heart of many political
controversies. Despite its importance, affirmative action does not have one clearcut definition; rather, its definition depends on the discussion’s general field. 5
Its broad dictionary definition describes affirmative action as “[t]he practice of
selecting people for jobs, college spots, and other important posts in part because
some of their characteristics are consistent with those of a group that has
historically been treated unfairly.” 6 Essentially, affirmative action is an
amalgamation of government-mandated, government-approved, and private
programs that use laws, policies, and practices to “end and correct the effects of
a specific form of discrimination.” 7 These programs focus on granting special
consideration to minority groups in education and employment. Supporters
3

Id.
Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on
Black Employment, 4 J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 47 (1964); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE
L.J. 427 (1997).
5
THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR ACCESS, EQUITY, AND DIVERSITY (AAAED), History of Affirmative
Action, Diversity, and Inclusion–What is Affirmative Action? https://www.aaaed.org/aaaed/About_Affirmative_
Action__Diversity_and_Inclusion.asp.
6
Affirmative Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016).
7
Walter Feinberg, Affirmative Action, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL ETHICS, Sep. 15, 2005.
4
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argue that society needs affirmative action to fend off bias and prejudice against
minority groups. Its opponents contend that affirmative action policies create
reverse racism and favor one minority group over another. Still, others believe
that, while affirmative action was once necessary, it succeeded, so its policy is
unnecessary today. Affirmative action really seeks to “tak[e] positive steps to
end discrimination, to prevent its recurrence, and to create new opportunities
that were previously denied” to minority groups. 8
Affirmative action uses “good-faith efforts . . . to identify, select, and train
potentially qualified minorities” and, thus, emphasizes “targeted goals” that
address an institution’s past discrimination. 9 Its programs “encompass more
than outreach and recruitment . . . and include efforts to prevent discrimination
by eliminating barriers to equal . . . opportunity.” 10 For example, higher
education institutions have admissions policies that seek to increase their
populations’ diversity. If higher education institutions abandon affirmativeaction-based policies in their admissions programs in favor of race-neutral
policies, they risk creating a student body (and, ultimately, a graduating class)
that is demographically homogeneous. That necessarily results in a law school
applicant pool that does not meet any diversity, inclusion, and equality goals.
The inherent pipeline directly conflicts with corporations’ diversity
requirements for hiring law firms.
While I would like to say that these affirmative-action-based admissions
policies are unnecessary, unfortunately, the discrimination that minority groups
continue to face is too great to eliminate. We, as a society, need these policies to
ensure that all students have access to the same opportunities. Without these
admissions programs, a lack of diversity will flow from undergraduate classes
to graduate classes, including law school classes, too, then, law firms. Law
firms’ lack of diversity will affect which corporations are willing to hire them
because corporate clients demand diversity in the firms they retain.
First, this limited case Comment will address the three cases that provide
guidelines to higher education institutions about how they may use race in their
admissions processes: Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke;
Fisher I; and Fisher II. Then, this Comment will discuss an ongoing case,
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
(Harvard Corp.), 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted.
AAAED, https://www.aaaed.org/aaaed/About_Affirmative_Action__Diversity_and_Inclusion.asp.
Feinberg (2005); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., and Glenn C. Loury, Affirmative Action and Its Mythology, 19
J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 147 (2005).
10
AAAED, https://www.aaaed.org/aaaed/About_Affirmative_Action__Diversity_and_Inclusion.asp.
8
9
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A. Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke: The Supreme
Court Held That, Even If Minority Groups Experience Benefits, A
University May Not Use Race to Discriminate in Its Admissions Policies
under The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
In Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265,
98 S. Ct. 2733, 2735–36, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, the main issue was whether a public
university that received federal funds could constitutionally exhibit a preference
for racial minorities in its admissions policy. This case is particularly important
because the Supreme Court held that universities may not use race to
discriminate in their admissions policies under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, even if such consideration would benefit minority
groups. The reason this decision was important is that it distinguished a
university that considers race as a “plus” in an applicant’s favor from one that
makes admissions decisions solely on race. Additionally, the Supreme Court
used this case to identify the educational benefits that come from a diverse
student body as a compelling governmental interest.
Petitioner had two admissions programs: (1) The regular admissions
program (“Regular Admissions”); and (2) The special admissions program
(“Special Admissions”). 11 Under Regular Admissions, Petitioner automatically
rejected candidates with a grade point average (“G.P.A.”) lower than 2.5. 12 A
separate committee, of which members of minority groups made up the majority,
then operated Special Admissions, which asked candidates whether they wished
that the committee would consider them as “economically and/or educationally
disadvantaged” and members of a “minority group” (“blacks, Chicanos, Asians,
American Indians”). 13 If the committee found that such an applicant was
disadvantaged, the committee would rate the applicant in a manner similar to
Regular Admissions without the 2.5 G.P.A cutoff. 14 Additionally, the Special
candidates were not ranked against the candidates of the general admission. 15
Special Admissions admitted no “disadvantaged whites,” though many
applied. 16 After his second rejection, Respondent filed their action in state court
for mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief to compel his admission. 17 He
11

(1978).
12
13
14
15
16
17

Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2735–36, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id.
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alleged that Special Admissions excluded him based on his race in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the
California Constitution, and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which provided that “no person shall[,] on the ground of race or color[,] be
excluded from participating in any program receiving federal financial
assistance.” 18
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the California Supreme
Court’s finding that Petitioner should admit Respondent and in invalidating
Special Admissions but reversed its holding that Petitioner should not take race
into account for future admissions. 19 Justice Powell’s principal opinion was
three-fold, and Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with the first
two conclusions. The first was that Title VI proscribed “only those racial
classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause” if a State or its
agencies employed it. 20 The second was that any racial and ethnic classifications
were “inherently suspect and call[ed] for the most exacting judicial scrutiny.” 21
They agreed that, while the goal of achieving a diverse student body was
sufficiently compelling to justify considering race in admissions decisions,
Special Admissions, “which foreclose[d] consideration to persons like
[R]espondent,” was unnecessary to this goal and was, therefore, invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause. 22 The third was that, since Petitioner could not
satisfy its burden to prove that, even without Special Admissions, it would have
denied Respondent, Petitioner must admit Respondent. 23 Justices Stevens,
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Stewart, whose opinion was that whether race
could ever be a factor in admissions decisions was not at issue in this case; that
Title VI applied; and that Petitioner excluded Respondent and, thus, violated
Title VI, affirmed the Court’s order that Petitioner should admit Respondent. 24
This case is difficult because, on one hand, it is easy to say that university
admissions programs should be completely fair for everyone and that
universities should consider every student with the same standards. However,
on the other hand, the students do not have access to the same opportunities,
privileges, or experiences. I agree with Justice Blackmun that, while hopefully
in the future, universities will not need affirmative action programs, such
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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programs are important tools for universities that help combat discrimination’s
ongoing effects. Thus, these programs are necessary, and it would be difficult
for such a program to be race-neutral and still achieve the same diversity goals.
B. Fisher I: The Supreme Court Held that Courts Must Use Strict Scrutiny
When It Reviews A University’s Race-Based Admissions Process and
Cannot Defer How the University Considers Race to Promote Diversity
In Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (“Fisher I”), 570 U.S. 297, 297, 133 S.
Ct. 2411, 2412, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474, the main issue was whether a court may defer
to the way a university considers an applicant’s race to promote diversity when
the court reviews that university’s race-based affirmative action program under
the Equal Protection Clause. This case plays off the Court’s determination in
Bakke that the educational benefits that come from a diverse student body are a
compelling governmental interest. The Court, here, determined that a university
is entitled to deference when it decides that diversity is essential to its
educational mission. However, a university is not entitled to deference regarding
whether its admissions process is narrowly tailored to achieve its diversity goal.
The university must prove that its admissions process is narrowly tailored, and
courts must ensure that it considers all applicants as individuals.
University considered race as one of many factors in its undergraduate
admissions process. 25 University, with its goal of increasing racial minority
enrollment, adopted its program after the United States Supreme Court decided
Grutter v. Bollinger, 5399 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304, which
upheld using race as “one of many ‘plus factors’ in an admissions program that
considered the overall individual contribution of each candidate,” and Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257, which held
unconstitutional “an admissions program that automatically awarded points to
applicants from certain racial minorities.” 26 University rejected Petitioner’s,
who was Caucasian, admission to its 2008 class. 27
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit’s decision was incorrect
because it did not hold University to strict scrutiny’s demanding burden from
Grutter and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57
L.Ed.2d 750. 28 The Court found that the courts below were correct when they
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 297, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2412, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013).
Id. (citing: Grutter v. Bollinger, 5399 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304; Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257.)
27
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (“Fisher I”), 570 U.S. at 297.
28
Id. (citing: Grutter, 5399 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct.
25
26
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found that Grutter called for deference to the University, but, once the
University established that its goal of diversity was “consistent with strict
scrutiny,” the University must prove that the way it attained diversity was
“narrowly tailored to its goal.” 29 The University had an obligation to
demonstrate that admissions processes “‘ensure that each applicant is evaluated
as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the
defining feature of [their] application,’” which the Judiciary must determine. 30
Narrow tailoring also required that a reviewing court must verify that it was
“necessary” for the university to use race to achieve diversity’s educational
benefits. 31 The reasoning must then ultimately satisfy the reviewing court that
no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity. 32
Instead, the Fifth Circuit held that Petitioner could only challenge whether
the University decided to use race as an admissions factor “in good faith.” 33 It
presumed that the University acted in good faith and gave Petitioner the burden
to rebut that presumption at odds with Grutter’s command that all racial
classifications imposed by the government “must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.” 34 Strict scrutiny did not permit the Fifth Circuit or
the district court to accept the University’s assertion that it used race in a
permissible way without examining the process in practice. 35 Thus, the Court
vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. 36
It is important not to take universities at their word that their admissions
program is narrow enough to achieve their diversity goals. There must be a way
to determine whether a university’s admissions program fulfills its diversity
needs. This case provides important qualifications that courts may use to ensure
universities do not abuse their freedom to create their own race-based policies.

2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257.)
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 298. (citing: Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 337, 98 S.Ct. 2733,
57 L.Ed.2d 750.)
32
Id.
33
Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 298.
34
Id. (citing: Grutter, 5399 U.S. 306 at 326.)
35
Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 298–99.
36
Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 298. (citing: Grutter, 5399 U.S. 306.)
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C. Fisher II: The Supreme Court Held that Courts Must Review University’s
Race-Based Admissions Process under the Strict Scrutiny Standard
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher II”), 136 S. Ct. 2198,
2202, 195 L. Ed. 2d 511, the main issue is whether courts should review a public
university’s decision to consider race in its admissions policy under the strict
scrutiny standard. This case is important because it defines strict scrutiny. Under
strict scrutiny, racial consideration must be narrowly tailored to achieve
diversity. Universities must evaluate each applicant as individuals, not so that
their race or ethnicity is their application’s most important quality. The Court
held that, if there were a non-race-based approach that would promote the
university’s diversity interest in the same way as the university’s race-based
method, then the university cannot consider race in its admissions policy.
University used an undergraduate admissions system that had two
components: (1) As the State’s Top Ten Percent Law required, it offered
admission to any students who graduated from a Texas high school in the top
10% of their class; and (2) It then used applicants’ SAT score and high school
academic performance (student’s/applicant’s “Academic Index”) and “a holistic
review containing numerous factors, including race” (student’s/applicant’s
“Personal Achievement Index”). 37 University adopted this process after Grutter
v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger led it to conclude that its prior race-neutral
system did not provide diversity’s educational benefits. 38 University denied
Petitioner, who was not in her high school class’ top 10%, and she filed suit and
alleged that University’s racial consideration violated the Equal Protection
Clause and “disadvantaged her and other Caucasian applicants.” 39
Fisher I detailed three controlling principles that were relevant when courts
assess a public university’s affirmative action program’s constitutionality. 40
First, a university may not consider race “unless the admissions
process can withstand strict scrutiny,” i.e., it must show that its
“purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial,
and that its use of the classification is necessary” to accomplish that
purpose. 41 Second, “the decision to pursue the educational benefits
that flow from student body diversity is, in substantial measure, an
academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (“Fisher II”), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2202, 195 L. Ed. 2d 511 (2016).
Id. (citing: Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304; Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257.)
39
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 at 2202.
40
Id. (citing: Fisher I.)
41
Id. at 2202–03. (citing: Fisher I at 2418.)
37
38
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deference is proper.” 42 Third, when determining whether the use of
race is narrowly tailored to achieve the university’s permissible goals,
the school bears the burden of demonstrating that “available” and
“workable” “race-neutral alternatives” do not suffice. 43

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the “race-conscious admissions program in
use at the time of [P]etitioner’s application [was] lawful under the Equal
Protection Clause.” 44
This case is noteworthy because it stresses that universities should use raceneutral alternatives to achieve their diversity goals if such alternatives are
feasible. This reflects the Court’s concern about universities rushing to use race
in their admissions processes to solve their diversity problems. It forces the
universities to consider other issues outside of race and, possibly, outside their
admissions programs entirely, as the problem could lie elsewhere within the
universities.
II. STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. V. PRESIDENT & FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLL.: APPELLEE DID NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ASIANAMERICAN STUDENTS BECAUSE: (1) IT MET STRICT SCRUTINY’S
REQUIREMENTS; (2) IT DID NOT ENGAGE IN IMPERMISSIBLE RACIAL
BALANCING; AND (3) IT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED RACE-NEUTRAL
ALTERNATIVES BEFORE IT ADOPTED ITS RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS
POLICY
More recently, in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows
of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.), 980 F.3d 157, the Court considered whether
Appellee’s race-conscious undergraduate admissions process violated Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Appellant, Students for Fair Admissions, (“SFFA”) brought suit on
November 17, 2014, against Appellee, Harvard University, and alleged that
Appellee discriminated against Asian-American applicants in the undergraduate
admissions process and, thus, violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq (“Title VI”). 45 Appellee acknowledged that its
Id. at 2203. (citing: Fisher I at 2419.)
Fisher II. at 2203. (citing: Fisher I at 2420.)
44
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 at 2202.
45
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a petition for writ of certiorari submitted by the
Plaintiff/Petitioner. The case is Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
(Harvard Corp.), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d sub nom, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, (U.S. Jan. 24, 2022) (No.
42
43
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undergraduate admissions process considered race as “one factor among many,”
but claimed that it used race consistently with applicable law.46
A. Procedural History
The District Court considered two main issues: (1) Whether Appellant had
standing to sue Appellee for allegedly discriminating against Asian-American
applicants; and (2) Whether Appellee’s admissions process violated Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act. The court held that Appellant had standing to sue Appellee
for three reasons: (i) Its members would have standing on their own; (ii)
Litigation was relevant to its purpose; and (iii) The injunctive relief it sought did
not require its members’ participation. The District Court held that Appellee’s
admissions program did not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The District
Court determined that Appellee’s admissions process served a compelling and
substantial interest (the educational benefits that flow from diversity) and was
narrowly tailored to achieve Appellee’s diversity goals.
Appellant’s initial complaint alleged that Appellee: (1) Intentionally
discriminated against Asian-Americans and violated Title VI (“Count I”); (2)
Used racial balancing (“Count II”); (3) Failed to use race merely as a “plus”
factor in admissions decisions (“Count III”); (4) Failed to use race merely to fill
the last “few places” in the incoming freshman class (“Count IV”); (5) Used race
where there were available and workable race-neutral alternatives (“Count V”);
and (6) Used race as a factor in admissions (“Count VI”). 47 Appellant sought
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 48 Appellee
filed its answer on February 18, 2015, and denied any liability. 49
On September 23, 2016, Appellee moved: (1) To dismiss the lawsuit for lack
of standing; and (2) For judgment on the pleadings as to Counts IV and VI. 50 On
June 2, 2017, the District Court found that Appellant had the requisite standing
to pursue this litigation because it was an organization whose membership
included Asian-Americans who applied to Harvard, were denied admission, and
were prepared to apply and transfer to Harvard. 51 The District Court also granted
Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Counts IV and
VI (that Appellee did not use race only to fill the last few places in the incoming
20-1199).
46
Id. at 131–32.
47
Id. at 132.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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freshman class and that Appellee used race as a factor in admissions). 52 After
discovery, on June 15, 2018, the Parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on the four remaining counts, which the District Court denied on
September 28, 2018. 53 The case proceeded to trial on Counts I (intentional
discrimination), II (racial balancing), III (failure to use race merely as a “plus”
factor), and V (race-neutral alternatives). 54
B. Findings of Fact
The court found that Appellee did its best to create an environment where
students from all walks of life could interact to foster a more robust learning
environment. Appellee specifically focused on reaching low-income applicants
whose scores could not adequately reflect their potential and intelligence. The
admissions officers made judgments about each applicant as a person and as a
student and evaluated them individually and accordingly with their
circumstances so that their decisions reflected each applicant’s potential. The
Admissions Officers’ testimony proved that Appellee did not want its
Admissions Officers to consider race when they assigned profile ratings. While
there were inconsistencies in Appellee’s search criteria for students, the District
Court could not link them with any advantage or disadvantage to any racial
groups, nor could the District Court definitively state that they were accidental
or intentional. Additionally, statistical evidence proved that Appellee did not
impose diversity quotas and that there were no race-neutral alternatives that
would allow Appellee to adequately achieve its desired level of diversity.
Appellee’s goal was to admit the best freshman class, which did not mean
merely considering applicants with the strongest academic qualifications.
Appellee had the right to consider race, even if the applicants chose not to write
about how their race played a role in their lives.
Ultimately, the District Court found that the Admissions Officers held no
bias against Asian-American applicants and found that there was no individual
applicant against whom the Admissions Officers discriminated or intentionally
stereotyped.

52
53
54

Id.
Id.
Id.
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1. Appellee’s Interest in Diversity
There is no question that diversity, including racial diversity, is an important
aspect of education. 55 The evidence made it clear that a “heterogeneous student
body promotes a more robust academic environment with a greater depth and
breadth of learning, encourages learning outside the classroom, and creates a
richer sense of community . . . [and] [t]he benefits of a diverse student body are
also likely to be reflected by the accomplishments of graduates and improved
faculty scholarship following exposure to varying perspectives.” 56
Appellee’s mission is “‘to educate the citizens and citizen-leaders for our
society’ and it seeks to accomplish this ‘through . . . the transformative power of
a liberal arts and sciences education.’” 57 Appellee claimed that it valued and
pursued “many kinds of diversity within its classes, including different academic
interests, belief systems, political views, geographic origins, family
circumstances, and racial identities.” 58 Appellee’s admissions officers, faculty,
students, and alumni who testified at trial all echoed Appellee’s interest in
diversity and diversity’s importance in education. 59 Appellee, consistent with its
views of diversity’s benefits both in and outside the classroom, tried to “create
opportunities for interactions between students from different backgrounds and
with different experiences to stimulate both academic and non-academic
learning.” 60 Appellant did not contest diversity’s importance in education but
argued that Appellee’s “emphasis on racial diversity is too narrow and that the

55
Id. at 133. (citing: Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98
L. Ed. 873 (1954), supplemented sub nom, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753,
99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955).)
56
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 133.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 133–34. (Appellee gave, as examples, student living assignments, the available extracurricular
opportunities, and the athletic programs all of which Appellee “intended to promote a sense of community and
encourage exposure to diverse individuals and viewpoints.” Similarly, Appellee evaluated and affirmed its
interest in diversity on multiple occasions and gave, as an example, that, in 2015, Appellee established the
Committee to Study the Importance of Student Body Diversity, which Dean Rakesh Khurana (the “Khurana
Committee”). The Khurana Committee “reached the credible and well-reasoned conclusion that the benefits of
diversity at Harvard are ‘real and profound.’ The Khurana Committee endorsed Appellee’s efforts to “enroll a
diverse student body to ‘enhance[] the education of [its] students of all races and backgrounds [to] prepare[]
them to assume leadership roles in the increasingly pluralistic society into which they will graduate,’ achieve
the ‘benefits that flow from [its] students’ exposure to people of different backgrounds, races, and life
experiences’ by teaching students to engage across differences through immersion curriculum and the range of
scholarly interests.” The Khurana Committee “emphatically embrace[d] and reaffirm[ed] the University’s longheld view that student body diversity—including racial diversity—is essential to [its] pedagogical objectives and
institutional mission.”)
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full benefits of diversity can be better achieved by placing more emphasis on
economic diversity.” 61
2. The Admissions Process
Several admissions officers testified that reviewing application files is a
“time-consuming, whole-person review process” in which they evaluate every
applicant as a unique individual. 62 The admissions officers “attempt to make
collective judgments about each applicant’s personality, intellectual curiosity,
character, intelligence, perspective, and skillset” and “evaluate each applicant’s
accomplishments in the context of [their] personal and socioeconomic
circumstances” to make admissions decisions “based on a more complete
understanding of an applicant’s potential than can be achieved by relying solely
on objective criteria.” 63
a. Admissions Office’s Efforts to Obtain a Diverse Applicant Pool
Appellee’s Office of Admissions and Financial Aid (the “Admissions
Office”) decides which students Appellee accepts, rejects, or waitlists. 64 This is
a difficult task because the applicant pool is both large and filled to the brim
with talent. 65 Thus, while academic excellence is necessary, it is not alone
sufficient to gain admission, and the Admissions Office must attract applicants
who are exceptional in ways outside standardized test scores and high school
grades. 66 Appellee has extensive and multifaceted outreach efforts that it
undertakes to attract these exceptionally strong and diverse applicant pools. 67
Appellee also places a particular emphasis on communicating with potential
low-income minority applicants “whose academic potential might not be fully
reflected in their scores.” 68 Despite these efforts, however, “African American
Id. at 133.
Id. at 136.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 134.
65
Id. (Appellee gave, as an example, that there were around 35,000 applicants for admission to the class
of 2019. Among these applicants, approximately 2,700 had a perfect verbal SAT score; 3,400 had a perfect math
SAT score; and over 8,000 had perfect GPAs. Appellee’s target class size is roughly 1,600 students, and admitted
around 2,000 applicants, based on an expectation that approximately 80% of those admitted applicants will
enroll. Given its target class size and outstanding applicant pool, Appellee cannot extend offers to every applicant
with a perfect GPA without also expanding its class size by 400%; rejecting every applicant with an imperfect
GPA; and eliminating students’ athletic, extracurricular, or other academic achievements, or life experiences.)
66
Id. at 135.
67
Id.
68
Id. (Specifically, Appellee recruits minority students, including Asian Americans, through its
Undergraduate Minority Recruitment Program (“UMRP”), which writes letters, makes calls, and sends current
61
62
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and Hispanic applicants remain a relatively modest portion” of the applicant
pool, “together accounting for only about 20% of domestic applicants.” 69 In
contrast, “Asian-American . . . students have accounted for approximately 22%
of the total applicants.” 70
b. The Application
Applicants may, but need not, identify their race in their application, either
in their personal statement and/or essays or they may check a box on the
application form for one or more “preset racial groups.” 71 If the applicants
disclose their racial identities, Appellee may take race into account, “regardless
of whether applicants write about that aspect of their backgrounds or otherwise
indicate that it is an important component of who they are.” 72
i. Alumni and Staff Interviews
Alumni interviewers completed an evaluation form on which they assigned
numerical ratings for applicants in academic, personal, and overall categories
that aligned with Appellee’s admissions officers’ rating categories. 73 Beyond
this, alumni interviewers wrote comments that explained their ratings, which
then went into the applicant’s file. 74 Although the Interviewer Handbook
contained a section on “distinguishing excellences[,] including ‘ethnic . . .
factors,’” Appellee did not coach alumni interviewers to “boost the ratings they
assign to applicants based on race or ethnicity.” 75 However, Appellee did
instruct them that they should “‘[b]e aware of, and suspect, [their] own biases,’
and that awareness of one’s biases [was] important because ‘no one can really
be “objective” in attempting to evaluate another person.’” 76 Appellee’s
admissions staff was a diverse group that included Asian Americans. 77
undergraduates to their hometowns to speak with prospective applicants. Appellee also targets low-income and
first-generation college students regardless of racial identity through a recruiting program that operates in
conjunction with the Harvard Financial Aid Initiative (“HFAI”). Through the HFAI recruitment program,
Appellee “employs students who return to their hometowns and visit high schools to talk about the affordability
of Harvard and other colleges with need-blind admissions programs.”)
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 137. (Some of the options include American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Black or African
American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, or White.)
72
Id.
73
Id. at 137.
74
Id. at 138.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. (“Several admissions officers testified at trial and forcefully denied the suggestion that racial animus
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Appellee awarded a small percentage of applicants an interview with an
Admissions Office staff member. 78 Students who received staff interviews were
mostly among the strongest applicants and Appellee accepted those students at
a “comparatively high rate.” 79
ii. Application Review Process
The Admissions Office decided which applicants to admit, reject, or
waitlist. 80 The Admissions Office did not provide new admissions officers with
and written guidance about how they should consider race in the admissions
process at this time. 81 A “first reader” initially reviewed the applications and
assigned the applicant a rating based on regularly-updated reading procedures. 82
First readers, and all subsequent readers, assigned an overall rating that included
four profile ratings 83 and at least three school support ratings 8485 The ratings
typically ranged from 1 to 4, with 1 as the strongest rating. 86

or conscious prejudice against Asian Americans infect Harvard’s admissions process.”)
78
Id. (“Although some staff interviews are offered on a first come, first served basis, many applicants
secure staff interviews because they are well-connected or particularly attractive candidates, or because they are
from a part of the country where an alumni interview may be unavailable.”)
79
Id. (“Asian American applicants are less likely to have a staff interview than white, African American,
or Hispanic applicants. [PX619]. Among applicants who receive a staff interview, 59% of African Americans,
48% of Hispanics, 53% of whites and 44% of Asian Americans are admitted. [Id.]. The lower admission rate for
staff-interviewed Asian Americans is driven primarily by the fact that Asian American applicants are less likely
than African American and Hispanic applicants, and far less likely than white applicants, to be recruited Athletes,
Legacies, on the Dean’s or Director’s interest list, or Children of faculty and staff (“ALDCs”), all of whom are
advantaged in Harvard’s admissions process.”)
80
Id.
81
Id. at 139. (“Although[,] [Appellee] amended its admissions reading procedures in 2018 for the class
of 2023 to explicitly instruct admissions officers that they “should not take an applicant’s race or ethnicity into
account in making any of the ratings other than the Overall rating” and that for the overall rating “[t]he
consideration of race or ethnicity may be considered only as one factor among many.”)
82
Id. at 140. (“Except for the recent changes to the reading procedures to provide more explicit guidance
on the use of race, the substantive guidance on rating applicants has remained largely the same in recent years . . .
Each of the profile ratings assigned by the first reader and any subsequent readers are preliminary and used as a
starting point for any later consideration of the applicant by a docket subcommittee or the full Admissions
Committee.”)
83
Id. (These four profile ratings included: (1) Academic; (2) Extracurricular; (3) Athletic; and (4)
Personal.)
84
Id. (These three ratings reflected each recommendation letter’s strength that teachers and guidance
counselors submitted on the applicant’s behalf.)
85
Id.
86
Id. (“Ratings of 5 and 6 are also available and indicate either weakness or special circumstances, for
example where family responsibilities prevent the applicant from participating in extracurricular activities.
Admissions officers may also use “+” (stronger) and “–” (weaker) signs to fine tune a rating, with a rating of 2+
being stronger than a rating of 2, which is stronger than a rating of 2–.”)
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Appellee also considers whether applicants will “offer a diverse perspective
or are exceptional in ways that do not lend themselves to quantifiable metrics.” 87
Appellee may give applicants a “tip” for “‘distinguishing excellences,’ such as
capacity for leadership, creative ability, and geographic, economic, and racial or
ethnic factors.” 88
In making admissions decisions, Appellee’s goal was to admit the best
freshman class, not merely a class with the strongest applicants based solely on
academic qualifications. 89
iii. Appellee’s Use of Race in Admissions
Throughout the admissions process, the Admissions Office leadership tracks
the “racial composition” for the general applicant pool, the students
recommended for admission, and the admitted students. 90 This composition
helps the Admissions Office see how well its efforts to achieve a diverse class
work and helps Appellee forecast its “overall yield rate” because different racial
groups historically accept Appellee’s offers at different rates. 91 Appellee uses
this composition to determine how many students it should admit overall to
avoid either under or overfilling its class. 92
The Admissions Officers also use race to evaluate applicants and assign an
overall rating, however, while race may be a “tip,” or “plus,” factor for
admissions decisions, it is “only one factor among many used to evaluate an
applicant.” 93 “Race is only intentionally considered as a positive attribute.” 94
Id. at 142.
Id.
89
Id. at 144. (“To summarize the use of race in the admissions process, Harvard does not have a quota
for students from any racial group, but it tracks how each class is shaping up relative to previous years with an
eye towards achieving a level of racial diversity that will provide its students with the richest possible experience.
It monitors the racial distribution of admitted students in part to ensure that it is admitting a racially diverse class
that will not be overenrolled based on historic matriculation rates which vary by racial group. Although racial
identity may be considered by admissions officers when they are assigning an applicant’s overall rating,
including when an applicant discloses their race but does not otherwise discuss it in their application, race has
no specified value in the admissions process and is never viewed as a negative attribute. Admissions officers are
not supposed to, and do not intentionally, consider race in assigning ratings other than the overall rating.”)
90
Id. at 146.
91
Id. (For example, the composition can show whether Appellee sees an increase in applications from
students with backgrounds that on which it placed a special recruiting emphasis, and whether Appellee admitted
minority students in numbers that will likely lead to a racially diverse class. Also, admitted Asian-American
students usually matriculate at a higher rate than white students, while admitted Hispanic, African American,
Native American, and multi-racial applicants matriculate at a lower rate.)
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
87
88
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Admissions Officers “are not supposed to, and do not intentionally,” consider a
student’s race, however, Appellee’s application reading procedures “did not
instruct readers not to consider race in assigning those ratings until 2018, when
[it] amended the reading procedures for the class of 2023 to provide more
explicit guidance on the appropriate use and non-use of race.” 95
3. Non-Statistical Evidence of Discrimination
While there were inconsistencies in Appellee’s search criteria, the District
Court could not link them to any advantage or disadvantage to any racial
minority group. The District Court also could not say with certainty whether
these inconsistencies were intentional or accidental. However, the District Court
concluded that Appellee specified to its Admissions Officers that they should
not consider race when they assigned personal ratings to the applicants.
Ultimately, the District Court found that there was no bias against AsianAmerican applicants and found that the Admissions Officers did not
discriminate or intentionally stereotype any individual Asian-American
applicant
a. Sparse Country
Appellant offers a different side to Appellee’s admissions process. Appellee
uses a search list based on a potential applicant’s ACT, SAT, or PSAT test scores
that helps Appellee market itself to diverse students, but the necessary scores a
student must achieve to make the search list varies by gender, GPA, geography,
and race. 96 Appellant also puts forth other anomalies in the search list selection
criteria. 97
While Appellant agreed that the list was a marketing tool, it wanted the
District Court to consider this “sparse country” disparity between the required
scores for Asian-American and white students to make the list is evidence that
95

Id.
Id. at 153. (For example, to make Appellee’s class of 2018 search list, “a white male high school student
from outside “sparse country” needs an SAT score of 1380, while black, Chicano, Hispanic, Native American,
and Puerto Rican students needed only an 1100.)
97
Id. at 153. (“For example, assuming an applicant reported a sufficiently high GPA, for the class of
2018, Harvard lowered the SAT score required to make the search list to 1310 for students from ‘sparse country’
who identified their race as white, other, or unidentified while not simultaneously lowering the required score
for Asian American students from the same states to the same level. Consequently, Asian-American students
from the same states needed to score 1350 or 1380, depending on their gender, to make the search list. Some
Asian-American students, therefore, did not make the search list, when white students from the same area who
had similar grades and SAT scores dId.”)
96
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Appellee intentionally imposes more selective admissions criteria on AsianAmerican students to artificially suppress Asian-American representation. 98
Overall, the District Court decided that the “inconsistencies in the search
criteria do not seem to be linked to efforts to advantage or disadvantage any
particular racial group, and it was unclear from the testimony at trial whether
these variations were accidental or intentional.” 99
b. The OCR Report
Appellant also pointed out that this case was not the first time Appellee’s
discrimination against Asian-American students in its admissions process came
to light. 100 Appellant’s argument is that “repeated instances of smoke should
heighten concerns about a fire.” 101
In the late 1980s, Appellee faced similar allegations that the United States
Department of Justice Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) put together a report (the
“OCR Report”) that “reached an overall conclusion that Harvard did not
discriminate against Asian-American applicants to its undergraduate program in
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.”102
Appellee did not hold a meeting with its admissions officers or otherwise
require that its admissions officers modify their evaluation practices to avoid
stereotyping after the OCR Report found that Appellee did not discriminate
against Asian-American students, despite some unfavorable specific findings. 103
98
Id. at 154. (However, notably, in the years that Appellee did not lower the “sparse country” SAT search
list score for Asian-American students in proportion with the lower requirement for white students, it selected
Asian-American students based on lower ACT scores than similarly situated white students from “more urban
areas.”)
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 155. (These “unfavorable specific findings” were “broadly consistent with stereotypes” and noted
that, “In addition to examining the ethnic reader’s comments, OCR’s concern for the potential stereotyping of
Asian-American applicants prompted a review of reader comments for negative characterizations, which could
have an impact on the admissions decision and ratings. On its face, reader comments revealed several recurring
characterizations attributed to Asian-American applicants. Quite often, Asian-American applicants were
described as being quiet/shy, science/math oriented, and hard workers . . . While such descriptions may not seem
damaging, OCR was conscious that problems of ‘model minority’ stereotypes could negatively impact AsianAmerican applicants as a whole. This concern was also raised when OCR’s file review came upon comments . . .
suggesting that most or all Asian-American applicants ‘want to be a doctor . . .” OCR noted that, in a number of
cases, Asian-American applicants were described as ‘quiet, shy, reserved, self-contained, soft spoken’ and that
these characteristics were underlined for added emphasis by the reader. While white applicants were similarly
described, OCR found such descriptions ascribed to Asian-American applicants more frequently . . . OCR
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Conversely, the District Court, based on the Admissions Officers’ testimony,
concluded that Appellee made it clear to its Admissions Officers more recently
that they should not use race to assign profile ratings. 104
c. More Recent Allegations of Stereotyping and Bias
Appellant also brought up more recent examples where admissions officers
referred to Asian-American applicants as “‘quiet,’ ‘hard worker,’ ‘bright,’ but
‘bland,’ ‘flat,’ or ‘not exciting.’” 105 The Admissions Officers toe the line of
improper racial consideration because, while Appellee instructs them to consider
race in the admissions process without stepping into unlawful discrimination. 106
It is true that Asian-American applicants “face both positive and negative
stereotypes,” and that Asian-American applicants have “significantly higher
median incomes” and are “more likely to hold science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics occupations than the United States population more
broadly.” 107 Therefore, “the Court is sensitive to the challenge of differentiating
among discriminatory comments that evidence actual stereotyping, animus, or
racism and comments about a particular applicant that may incidentally
reference a stereotypical characteristic” when Admissions Officers review
applications. 108
Appellant did not show that any applicant received these descriptors due to
their race or that there was any systemic reliance on racial stereotypes. 109
Without a clear and distinct pattern that the Admissions Officers used
stereotypes, the District Court accepted that the Asian-American applicants
received these descriptors because they were “truthful and accurate rather than
reflective of impermissible stereotyping.”110 The District Court ultimately found
that comments on application files and Admissions Office correspondence
recognized that reader comments were also sometimes echoes of other reviewers’ commentaries related to the
applicant. OCR also noted a few cases in which the readers referred to an applicant as ‘a classic V.N.
[Vietnamese] bootstrap case’ or ‘a classic BC/NC [blue collar/non-college background] Asian-American from
the inner-city.’ While it was clear from the context of the statement that the readers were not criticizing the
applicants, and that there was no negative intention, the comments do suggest a tendency to stereotype by calling
the applicants ‘classic.’”)
104
Id. at 155–56.
105
Id. at 156.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 156–57.
109
Id. at 157. (The District Court noted that the “notes to the effect that several Asian-American applicants
were ‘quiet’ or ‘flat’ also include[d] notes for white, African American, and Hispanic applicants who were also
described as ‘quiet,’ ‘shy,’ or ‘understated.’”)
110
Id.
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“[did] not suggest any pervasive bias against Asian-Americans among
[Appellee’s] admissions officers or its admissions leadership,” and that “[there
was no] individual applicant whom [the Court] can determine was discriminated
against or intentionally stereotyped by an admissions officer.” 111
4. Statistical Analysis
The District Court held that Appellee did not have any “racial quotas” and
did not “attempt[] to achieve classes with any specified racial composition.” 112
The District Court determined that Appellee evaluated its class’ “racial
composition” and provided tips to applicants “to help it achieve a diverse class,”
and that those tips were “necessary to achieve a diverse class[,] given the relative
paucity of minority applicants that would be admitted without such a tip.”113
Additionally, Appellee “track[ed] and consider[ed]” diversity’s “various
indicators . . ., including race,” in its admissions process, its admitted classes’
“racial composition[s]” “varied in a manner inconsistent with the imposition of
a racial quota or racial balancing.” 114
The District Court found that the statistical evidence showed Appellee did
not impose racial quotas or that it otherwise engaged in impermissible racial
balancing. 115
5. Race Neutral Alternatives
Under the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny rubric, universities can consider
race in admissions to achieve diversity only if there are no other “workable raceneutral alternative[s]” that ensure a “sufficiently diverse class.” 116 A race-neutral
alternative is “workable” only if it allows universities to achieve the benefits
“that it derives from its current degree of diversity within a given class year,
Id. at 158.
Id. at 176.
113
Id. (In trying to assure a diverse class, the admissions officers considered various “qualitative and
numerical indicators of diversity,” which included the admitted-students group’s racial composition.)
114
Id. (“The demographic makeup of [Appellee’s] classes from 1980 through 2019 show significant
changes to the composition of each class, and there has been more year-to-year variation in admitted Asian
American applicants than year-to-year variation in the number of applicants. From 1980 to 2019, Asian
Americans went from 4.1% of applicants and 3.4% of admitted students to 21.2% of applicants and 20.6% of
admitted students. Since 1980, the Asian American proportion of the admitted class has increased roughly fivefold, and since 1990 the Asian American proportion of the admitted class has increased roughly twofold.
[Appellant] did not offer expert testimony on racial balancing and instead asserts that the claim can be resolved
without any expert analysis.”)
115
Id.
116
Id. at 177
111
112
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while also being practical, affordable, and not requiring a material decline in
academic quality or any other [valued] measures of excellence.” 117
Appellee’s race-conscious admissions policy had a significant impact on its
classes’ racial diversity. 118 While this policy particularly benefitted “African
American and Hispanic applicants,” it overall “result[ed] in fewer AsianAmerican and white students being admitted,” however, it could improve some
Asian-American applicants’ admissions chance if they “connect[ed] their racial
identities with particularly compelling narratives.” 119 Without other
adjustments, if Appellee eliminated its racial consideration, “the African
American representation . . . [would] decline from approximately 14% to 6% . . .
and Hispanic representation to decline from 14% to 9%.” 120
The District Court noted that Appellee’s admissions policy did not result in
under-qualified students’ admission “in the name of diversity;” rather, the tip for
race “impact[ed] who among the highly-qualified students in the applicant pool
will be selected for admission to a class that is too small to accommodate more
than a small percentage of those qualified for admission.” 121
Both parties’ experts examined many race-neutral alternatives and whether
they, “alone or in combination,” could “conceivably limit the decline in racial
diversity.” 122 These alternatives included: (1) Eliminating early action; (2)
Eliminating tips for ALDC applicants; (3) Expanding recruiting and financial
aid; (4) Admitting more transfer students; and (5) Eliminating standardized
testing. 123
Thus, Appellee demonstrated that no approach, “individually or in
combination,” would “allow it to reach the level of racial diversity that it

Id. at 178
Id.
119
Id. (Although Appellee always considered race “in conjunction with other factors and metrics,” it was
a “determinative tip” for approximately 45% of all admitted African American and Hispanic applicants. “At
least 10% of Harvard’s admitted class, including more than one third of the admitted Hispanics and more than
half of the admitted African Americans, would most likely not be admitted in the absence of Harvard’s raceconscious admissions process.”)
120
Id. (“Over the course of four years, the number of African American and Hispanic students at Harvard
would fall by nearly 1,000 students.”)
121
Id. (“Therefore, removing attention to race, without a workable race-neutral alternative, would cause a
sharp decline in the percentage of African American and Hispanic students at Harvard without resulting in a
particularly significant increase in the overall academic strength of the class.”)
122
Id. at 179.
123
Id.
117
118
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believe[d] necessary to achieve its educational mission without significant
consequences to the strength of its admitted class.” 124
C. Conclusions of Law
The Appellate Court had five followings specific to this case:
First, there was no evidence, neither during the trial nor after the Court
reviewed all exhibits and written submissions, either of “any racial animus
whatsoever” or that Appellee intentionally discriminated against applicants
beyond a race-conscious admissions policy. 125 Additionally, there was no
evidence that the “Asian American identity” negatively affected any admissions
decision. 126
Second, race-conscious admissions program allowed Appellee to achieve “a
level of robust diversity” that would otherwise be impossible. 127
Third, the Court believed that Asian Americans were “not inherently less
personable than any demographic group,” however, it did believe that Asian
Americans were “not more intelligent or more gifted in extracurricular pursuits
than any other group.” 128
Fourth, there was a statistical difference in the personal ratings “with white
applicants faring better than Asian American applicants,” while Asian
Americans did better on the extracurricular and academic ratings. 129 While
124

Id.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 201–02.
126
Id. at 202. (See, Supra n. 62. (The Court noted that, under the Title VI standard applicable outside the
higher admissions context, Count I would fail because Appellant did not show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that: (1) Appellee used race to discriminate against applicants; (2) The discrimination was intentional;
and (3) The discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for admissions decisions. (citing: Goodman v.
Bowdoin Coll., 380 F.3d 33, 43 (1st Cir. 2004). (citing: Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“The requirement for a ‘substantial or motivating factor’ requires evidence of racial animus,” which was not
present in this case.)) Further, under Goodman’s standard, the Court would enter judgment for Appellee because
it showed that it employed its admissions program to promote diversity, which was not an invidious
discriminatory purpose. Appellee made admissions decisions only after a “careful process that consider[ed] and
appreciat[ed] the diversity that applicants from diverse racial backgrounds, including Asian Americans,
provid[ed].” Appellee’s only intentional consideration of race viewed increased diversity as a positive attribute
to its admitted class, which it achieved “by considering an individual’s race through an individualized holistic
evaluation” the way the Supreme Court envisioned. Further, this Court was confident that “some external racecorrelated factors and perhaps some slight implicit biases among some admissions officers that, while
regrettable, cannot be completely eliminated in a process that must rely on judgments about individuals” resulted
in the identified statistical disparities in personal ratings and admissions probabilities.))
127
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 202.
128
Id.
129
Id. (These three ratings “incorporated subjective and objective elements.”)
125
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implicit biases could affect Appellee’s ratings, they were unintentional to the
extent that race caused the disparities, and a judicial dictate that Appellee must
abandon racial considerations in its admissions process would not cure them. 130
Fifth, Appellee’s admissions program was “conceptually narrowly tailored
to meet its interest in diversity.” 131 In practice, it “did not seem to unduly burden
Asian Americans[,] despite the fact that some percentage of Asian American
applicants . . . received lower personal ratings than white applicants who seem
similarly situated.” 132 Race-conscious admissions programs “will always
penalize to some extent” the groups that the process did not advantage, but the
compelling interest in diversity and all benefits from a diverse population
justified this penalty. 133 Here, “any relative burden on Asian Americans (and it
is [unclear] that there is a disproportionate burden)” was not enough to warrant
a finding that Appellee’s admissions process did not survive strict scrutiny or
that Appellee must forgo diversity to favor solely quantifiable metrics. 134
1. Overview
The Appellate Court first affirmed that Appellant had standing and found
that Appellee met its burden and showed that its admissions process complied
with the Supreme Court’s principles. 135 The Appellate Court concluded that it
should issue judgment for Appellee on the remaining claims (Count I:
Intentional discrimination; Count II: Impermissible racial balancing; Count III:
Failure to use race merely as a “plus factor;” Count V: The availability of raceneutral alternatives). 136 The Appellate Court relied on the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin. 137 In Fisher, the Supreme Court
stated three controlling principles discussed above that reflected the sum of its
holdings in cases about higher education admissions and guided Title VI’s
application in this case. 138

130

Id.
Id.
132
Id. (“The reason for these lower scores is unclear, but they are not the result of intentional
discrimination. They might be the result of qualitative factors that are harder to quantify, such as teacher and
guidance counselor recommendations, or they may reflect some implicit biases.”)
133
Id. at 202–03.
134
Id. at 203.
135
Id. at 183.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 184. (citing: Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 195 L. Ed. 2d 511 (2016)).
138
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 188–89.
131
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The Supreme Court consistently used strict scrutiny when it reviewed school
admissions programs that considered race. 139 When the Court says that a school
admissions program is subject to strict scrutiny, it means that the admissions
program is subject to strict scrutiny, not just the admissions decisions that
“involve the students that it seeks to advantage.” 140
Appellee argued that the court should apply a “facially neutral policy.” 141
Analytically, a facially neutral policy that “has a disparate impact by race” is
different from a policy that “admittedly considers race.” 142 “In reviewing a
uniformly applied facially neutral policy, ‘[d]etermining whether invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor [in its adoption] demands a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may
be available.’” 143 Policies that do not “explicitly consider” race are facially
neutral and violate the Equal Protection Clause “based on statistical evidence
only where they form a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race.” 144 A policy that relies on race at least in part is subject to strict scrutiny,
regardless of impact. 145
Appellee believed that its admissions program was “facially neutral” and
that the court should use a “less demanding” standard than strict scrutiny to
evaluate it. 146 Appellee claimed that its admissions program was “facially
neutral” because it did not “explicitly prioritize” any racial group over another
and it allowed the admissions officers to evaluate every student’s racial and
ethnic identity “in the context of [their] background and circumstances.” 147 The
Appellate Court decided, however, that Appellee’s admissions process was not
“facially neutral” from a Title VI perspective because the admissions officers
gave African American and Hispanic applicants tips, but was unlikely to give

Id. at 190.
Id. at 190 n. 56.
141
Id. at 189.
142
Id. at 189 n.55.
143
Id. (citing: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 346 F. Supp.
3d 174, 193 (D. Mass. 2018) (quoting: Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71, 83 (1st Cir. 2004)).
144
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 189 n.55 (citing: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (finding unconstitutional the administration of a facially neutral
policy for licensing laundries where permits had been denied to 200 Chinese applicants but granted to all but
one of 80-odd others permit applicants who were not Chinese); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct.
125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960) (finding unconstitutional the administration of a facially neutral policy for licensing
laundries where permits had been denied to 200 Chinese applicants but granted to all but one of 80-odd others
permit applicants who were not Chinese)).
145
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 189 n.55.
146
Id. at 190 n.56.
147
Id.
139
140
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those same race-based tips to white and Asian-American applicants. 148 “In the
case of a facially neutral policy, “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” 149 If the
court here applied that standard, it would easily find for Appellee on Appellant’s
claim of intentional discrimination because Appellant did not show any
discriminatory intent or purpose. 150
Appellee’s admissions process, therefore, was not “facially neutral”
because, even though Appellee’s admissions procedures did not “explicitly
preference particular racial groups,” Appellee used its applicants’ races to
“[pursue] its interest in diversity,” and it allowed its admissions officers to
consider an applicant’s race when the officer made an admissions decision,
“even when the applicant has not discussed their racial or ethnic identity in their
application.” 151 Appellee’s “acknowledged consideration of race” differs from
a facially neutral policy because a facially neutral policy requires that plaintiffs
“prove racial discrimination.” 152 Here, Appellee admitted that it used race, so
the issue became “whether it is permissible given the justification and the means
used to achieve the sought-after diversity—in other words, whether [Appellee’s]
use of race survives strict scrutiny.” 153
2. Appellee’s Admissions Program and Strict Scrutiny
Appellee’s admissions program passed strict scrutiny because its interest in
diversity was substantial and compelling, and its goals were sufficiently
measurable and permitted their adopted policies’ scrutiny. Additionally,
Appellee used its admissions program to review each applicant holistically and
consistently with the Supreme Court’s guidelines. Even though its admissions

148
Id. (citing: Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989)
(“In this circumstance, the standard for facially neutral policies could arguably be applied in evaluating any
disparate outcomes as between whites and Asian Americans, keeping in mind that the purpose of strict scrutiny
is to ferret out inappropriate racial classifications, and given that there is no suggestion of a racially motivated
classification involving whites and Asian Americans.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323, 123, S. Ct.
2325, 2336, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003) (“We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to smoke out
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that government is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool.” (quotation marks omitted and modifying punctuation omitted))).
149
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 190 n.56. (quoting: Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 55, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).)
150
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 190 n.56.
151
Id. at 189–90.
152
Id. at 190. (citing: Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71, 97 S.
Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (plaintiffs “failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor” for a rezoning decision that did not explicitly rely on race.)).
153
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 190.
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policies were, perhaps, imperfect, the District Court concluded that the
disparities did not come from any conscious racial prejudice.
a. Compelling Interest
In Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, the Court found that student body
diversity and the educational benefits that come from a diverse student body was
a compelling interest that could justify race’s consideration in the admissions
process: “As the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a
university’s admissions program [the remaining question is] whether the
program’s racial classification is necessary to promote this interest.” 154 Justice
Powell explained that “[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.” 155 Additionally,
in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court reaffirmed that “student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.” 156 In Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, a university’s goals should
include: “enhance[ing] the education of [its] students of all races and
background [to] prepare them to assume leadership roles in the increasingly
pluralistic society into which they will graduate,” achieving the “benefits that
flow from [its] students’ exposure to people of different background, races, and
life experiences” by teaching them to engage across differences through
immersion in a diverse community, and “broaden[ing] the perspectives of
teachers[, and] thus tend[ing] to expand the reach of the curriculum and the range
of scholarly interests of [its] faculty.” 157
In the current case, Appellee’s interest in student body diversity was
“substantial and compelling;” its goals were not “elusory or amorphous,” but
were, instead, “sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies
adopted to reach them.” 158 According to the Court, Appellee’s goals were like
those that the Supreme Court found concrete and precise” in Fisher v. Univ. of
154
Id. at 191 (citing: Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2761, 57
L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978)).
155
Id. (citing: Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 98 S.Ct. 2733.)
156
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (citing: Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
325, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 309,
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013) (reiterating that prior cases had found that “obtaining the
educational benefits of student body diversity is a compelling state interest” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
157
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (citing: Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 2211).
158
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (citing: Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211,
195 L. Ed. 2d 511 (2016)).
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Texas at Austin, and the Appellate Court in this case found that Appellee needed
racial categorizations to achieve those goals. 159 Appellee’s racial diversity, the
Court found, “would likely decline so precipitously that [Appellee] would be
unable to offer students the diverse environment that it reasonable [found]
necessary to its mission” without such racial categorizations. 160
b. Narrowly Tailored
Even where racial distinctions are permissible to further a compelling state
interest, a university is still “constrained in how it may pursue that end: ‘The
means chosen to accomplish the [university’s] asserted purpose must be
specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.’” 161 Therefore, to
satisfy strict scrutiny, “a university must make a showing that its plan is narrowly
tailored to achieve the only interest that this Court has approved in this context:
the benefits of a student body diversity that ‘encompasses a ... broa[d] array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element.’” 162 “When race-based action is necessary to further
a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring
requirement is also satisfied.” 163
To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot
use a quota system, 164 but instead must remain flexible enough to
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a
way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of
his or her application. 165 In other words, an admissions program must
be flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in
light of the particular qualifications of each applicant. 166 Thus,

159

Id.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192.
161
Id. (citing: Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 260 (1996) (quoting: Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986))).
162
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (citing: Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 4211 (quoting:
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2761, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978))).
163
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (quoting: Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
325, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003)) (citing: Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493,
109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (“The purpose of strict scrutiny is to ensure that ‘the means chosen ‘fit’
. . . th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.’”)).
164
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (quoting: Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.)
165
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (quoting: Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 309 (quoting:
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.)).
166
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (quoting: Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting:
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317)).
160
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individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious
admissions program is paramount. 167

The Court in this case found that Appellee’s admission’s program “‘[bore] the
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan’ in that it used ‘race . . . in a flexible,
nonmechanical way’ and considered ‘as a “plus” factor in the context of
individualized consideration of each and every applicant.’” 168 Like the law
school in Grutter, Appellee: “‘engages in a highly individualized, holistic
review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment,’ ‘this
individualized consideration [is afforded] to applicants of all races,’ and its
‘race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures that all factors that may
contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race
in admissions decisions.’” 169
This case’s allegations, though, required more analysis because, while
Appellee proved that its admissions policy “must consider race to serve its
substantial and compelling interest,” there still must be a “‘further judicial
determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its
implementation.’” 170 Thus, “narrow tailoring further requires ‘that a raceconscious admissions program not unduly harm members of any racial
group’ 171“ due to “the ‘serious problems of justice’ 172“ associated with narrow
tailoring. 173
The last issue was whether Appellee’s admissions program unduly burdened
Asian American applicants. 174 There was no statistically significant difference
between Asian American and white applicants’ possible admission, which
suggested that Appellee’s race-conscious admissions policy did not place an
167
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (citing: Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Bakke, 438
U.S. at 318 (“identifying the ‘denial . . . of th[e] right to individualized consideration’ as the ‘principal evil’ of
the medical school’s admission’s program.’”).
168
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (citing: Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334).
169
Id. (quoting: supra at 337–38).
170
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 193 n.58 (citing: Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 311, 312–
13 (“strict scrutiny affords a plaintiff ‘closs analysis to the evident of how the [admission] process works in
practice.’”)).
171
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (quoting: Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341) (citing:
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 630, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3043, 111 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1990), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (a race-conscious admissions program must not “unduly burden individuals who are not members of
the favored racial and ethnic groups”)).
172
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (quoting: Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298).
173
Id.
174
Id.
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undue burden on its Asian American applicants. 175 However, other analysis
implied that Asian American applicants were at a disadvantage as compared
with white applicants, so this case’s questions became: (1) Why did Asian
American applicants score lower on the personal rating; (2) Did that lower score
unfairly affect their admission chances; and (3) If the lower score did unfairly
affect their chances, was that a burden on them when measured against
Appellee’s compelling interest in diversity? 176 There was the possibility that the
group of Asian Americans that applied did not possess Appellee’s preferred
personal qualities at the same rate that the white applicants did and that the white
applicants had weaker academics than the Asian American applicants. 177 There
was little to no evidentiary support for this theory, but it “would result in a
finding of no undue burden and a narrowly tailored process that satisfied strict
scrutiny.” 178 Alternatively, there was the possibility that overt discrimination
and implicit bias disadvantaged Asian American applicants. 179
The Court saw no evidence of discrimination in the personal ratings other
than “the slight numerical disparity itself,” which the Court believed was minor
and that several other factors, such as race-correlated inputs to the rating (i.e.,
recommendation letters), could partially explain. 180 “Just as the Court cannot
explain the variations in the academic and extracurricular ratings, it cannot
definitively explain the difference in the personal ratings,” but the Court found
that “the disparity was small and reflect[ed] neither intentional discrimination
against Asian-American applicants nor a process that was insufficiently tailored
to avoid the potential for unintended discrimination.” 181 Even if there were
175

Id.
Id.
177
Id. (“In other words, [if we assume that] Asian American and white applicants have the same academic
and extracurricular potential and the same quality of personal attributes as demographic groups, it could be that
asymmetric portions of each of these groups apply to Harvard. This would explain why Asian American
applicants . . . did better than white applicants on the academic and extracurricular ratings and why white
applicants . . . did better on the personal rating[,] despite the likelihood that Asian Americans are not inherently
more intelligent and white applicants are not inherently more personable.”).
178
Id. at 194. E.g., Id. at n. 59 (“There may be little evidentiary support for this hypothesis because it was
not in the interest of either party to develop this scenario. SFFA was wedded to the idea that the Asian American
applicants were superior in two profiles and discriminated against on a third, while Harvard was unwilling to
overtly argue that Asian American applicants were actually weaker in personal criteria, notwithstanding their
stronger average academic performance and Harvard’s acknowledgment that Asian American applicants tend to
be stronger in their extracurricular pursuits. The Court does not think, however, that demonstrable,
disproportionate strength of a racial group in one area necessarily implies that the same racial group should be
strong in all areas. If one assumes that raw talent and race are unrelated, it would be unsurprising to find that
applicants that excel in one area, tend to be somewhat weaker in other areas.”).
179
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 194.
180
Id.
181
Id.
176
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“unwarranted disparity in the personal ratings,” the Court could not identify a
situation where the personal ratings affected an individual applicant. 182 Thus,
the Court found that the personal ratings did not burden Asian-American
applicants more than they did white applicants. 183 Further, the Court found no
evidence of “any discriminatory animus or conscious prejudice” and that it could
interpret that certain statistics suggested that Appellee’s admissions process
“unintentionally favored some subsets of Asian-Americans.” 184
In terms of burden, the Court found that it would likely disadvantage at least
some Asian-American applicants if Appellee eliminated race’s consideration
because the “amici” testified that they “viewed their race or ethnicity as a critical
aspect of their life experiences and applications.” 185 Thus, the Court decided it
was vital that Asian-Americans and other racial minorities could discuss their
racial identities in their applications—“[a]s the Court has seen and heard, race
can profoundly influence applicants’ sense of self and outward perspective.” 186
If Appellee removed racial and ethnic considerations from the admissions
process entirely, Appellee would not only simultaneously deprive applicants,
including Asian-American applicants, “of their right to advocate the value of
their unique background, heritage, and perspective,” but also “deprive [itself] of
exceptional students who would be less likely to be admitted without a
comprehensive understanding of their background.” 187 Further, the Court stated
that Appellant did not present any evidence that reflected any discriminatory
animus, or an Asian-American applicant who Appellant could show that
Appellee would have admitted were it not for the personal ratings unfairly
deflating their application. 188
Thus, the Court concluded that Appellee designed and implemented its
admissions program in a way that allowed it to review every application in a
holistic manner that was consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance. 189
182

Id.
Id.
184
Id. (“The most likely causes of these statistical findings, however, is random variation in the admissions
process or omitted variable biases, not selective discrimination that favored some Asian Americans and
disfavored others.”)
185
Id.
186
Id. at 194–95.
187
Id. at 195.
188
Id. (“There thus remains the distinct possibility that a review of the available applications did not turn
up a rejected Asian American applicant who was clearly more qualified than the white applicants who were
admitted, or an applicant who received an obviously unjustified personal rating. This would strongly suggest
that Asian American applicants were not discriminated against relative to white applicants and were therefore
not unduly burdened by Harvard’s admissions program.”)
189
Id.
183
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Moreover, the Court concluded that, even though Appellee’s admissions process
was, perhaps, imperfect, “the statistical disparities between applicants from
different racial groups on which [Appellant]’s case rests [were] not the result of
any racial animus or conscious prejudice.” 190 The Court found that Appellee’s
admissions program was narrowly tailored to achieve a diverse class and the
benefits that flowed from such a class. 191
3. Summary
Even though Appellee’s admissions program survived strict scrutiny, it was
not perfect and would likely benefit from implicit bias training for admissions
officers; clear guidelines on how to use race in the admissions process; and a
note to admissions officers about the significant race-related statistical
disparities in the rating process. 192
Further, the Court repeated what the Supreme Court said in Fisher II:
The University now has at its disposal valuable data about the
manner in which different approaches to admissions may foster
diversity or instead dilute it. The University must continue to use
this data to scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program;
to
assess whether changing demographics have undermined the need
for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both
positive and negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems
necessary. The Court’s affirmance of the University’s admissions
policy today does not necessarily mean the University may rely on
that same policy without refinement. It is the University’s ongoing
obligation to engage in constant deliberation and continued
reflection regarding its admissions policies. 193
The Court did not intend, however, to require that Appellee have a system that
is “overly data driven.” 194 If Appellee used statistics to ensure that profile
ratings’, or any other measure’s, distribution was exact, even among various
groups, could run afoul of quotas’ prohibition. 195 More importantly, it might
defeat a comprehensive, holistic review process that would allow applicants’

190

Id.
Id.
192
Id. at 204. (“There is always the specter of perfection, but strict scrutiny does not require it and a few
identified imperfections, after years of litigating and sifting through applications and metrics, do not alone
require a finding that [Appellee’s] admissions program is not narrowly tailored.”)
193
Id. (quoting: Fisher II at 2213–15.)
194
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 204.
195
Id.
191
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admission with potentially non-quantifiable virtues. 196 However, now that
Universities understand how statistical analyses could reveal “otherwise
imperceptible statistical anomalies,” they should use these statistics “as a check
on the process and as a way to recognize when implicit bias might be affecting
outcomes.” 197
The Supreme Court always intended that affirmative action programs would
have limited durations. 198 For example, the Supreme Court articulated its
expectation that it would be unnecessary to use racial preferences to achieve a
diverse student body in twenty-five years. 199 However, as entrenched racism’s
and unequal opportunity’s effects remained obvious, it was imperative that
higher education institutions that used racial preferences to achieve a diverse
learning environment “ensure, through data and experience, that ‘race plays no
greater role than is necessary to meet its compelling interest’ in diversity and to
keep in mind that ‘racial classifications may sometimes fail to capture diversity
in all of its dimensions.’” 200
Here, the Court determined that ensuring Appellee’s diversity relied, at least
in part, on race-conscious admissions. 201 Appellee’s admission program passed
constitutional muster because it satisfied strict scrutiny’s requirements. 202 The
students Appellee admitted and who chose to attend it lived and learned
“surrounded by all sorts of people, with all sorts of experiences, beliefs, and
talents.” 203 This gave them the opportunity to know and understand each other
beyond race, “as whole individuals with unique histories and experiences.” 204
“It is this, at [higher education institutions,] that will move us, one day, to the
point where we see that race is a fact, but not the defining fact that tells us what
is important, but we are not there yet.” 205
Until then, race-conscious admissions programs that survive strict scrutiny
have an important place in society and help ensure that higher education
institutions offer a diverse atmosphere that fosters learning, improves
scholarship, and encourages mutual respect and understanding. 206
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing: Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003).)
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 205. (quoting: Fisher II at 2210.)
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205–06.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 3d at 133., on January 24, 2022. With the new change in Justices,
it is impossible to determine the case’s outcome. Whatever the Supreme Court
decides will directly affect the pipeline by which diversity leaks into law firms.
Should it do away with affirmative action-based admissions policies in higher
education institutions, the pool of graduates’ diversity will likely decline, which
will affect incoming and graduating law school classes, which decreases the
amount of diversity law firms can achieve.
Race-conscious admissions policies’ elimination will indirectly affect which
law firms corporations choose to hire. Since corporations use diversity as a
determining factor when retaining law firms, this diversity decrease will limit
which firms they can hire because there will be fewer firms that meet their
requirements. “The rich diversity at higher education institutions and the
benefits that flow from that diversity will foster the tolerance, acceptance, and
understanding that will ultimately make race-conscious admissions obsolete,”
and these effects will continue through to law firms and help them meet their
corporate clients’ diversity requirements. 207
Today’s large corporate clients demand that the lawyers who work on their
matters be diverse. To meet these demands, law firms must first hire qualified
and diverse attorneys (or prospective attorneys awaiting passage of their bar
admission examination). There must be a sufficient available pool of candidates
that satisfy diversity standards. The starting point for assuring a diverse pool,
however, cannot be at the law firm or law school level—it must be at the higher
education institution level using affirmative action as the basis for the
admissions process.
If corporations really have concerns about their law firms’ diversity, then
one solution to this problem would be corporations funneling money to protect
higher education institutions’ race-conscious admissions policies or donating
money to help their local institutions’ recruitment efforts or to create
scholarships or incentives specifically for minority students. Corporations’
pressuring law firms to be diverse seems, on its face, a reasonable request.
However, law firms have no control over their applicant pool’s diverse makeup. Thus, corporations must go straight to the source if they intend to make such
demands of law firms. Corporate clients must do their part to ensure that the next

207

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 205.
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generation of lawyers is more diverse than the one before. Otherwise, they must
realize that their standards are detrimental to meaningful diversity.

